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 After withdrawal: charterers’ wrongs 
and shipowners’ remedies 
 Simon Baughen * 
 The right of withdrawal is a potent remedy for a shipowner. However, exercising 
the remedy at a time when cargo is on board will lead to the shipowner’s incurring 
costs in fulfi lling contractual obligations owed to shippers, and, in a falling 
market, the shipowner will incur additional losses represented by the difference 
between the charter rate and the market rate for the unexpired residue of the 
terminated charter. As well as claiming the unpaid hire outstanding at the date 
of the withdrawal, the shipowner will want to recover these additional costs and 
losses. This article will examine the options open to shipowners in recovering 
both the costs of completing voyages under contracts of carriage with shippers 
and the loss sustained by withdrawing in a falling market. These remedies need to 
be set in the context of the web of contracts that are involved when carrying cargo 
under a time charter, such as contracts with shippers under, and lawful holders 
of, bills of lading, and contracts under sub- and sub-sub-charters. 
 I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Hire is the lifeblood of the shipowner’s business. To secure its punctual payment, time 
charters will invariably provide for the shipowner to have a right to withdraw the vessel 
from the charterer’s service in the event that hire is not paid punctually and in full. Market 
conditions tend to determine the issues relating to withdrawal that come before the courts. 
In the rising market of the 1970s, shipowners were keen to fi nd any excuse to get out of 
their time charters and pounced on any delay on the part of charterers in tendering full 
payment of hire. Since the fi nancial crisis of 2008 there has been a pronounced collapse in 
the market, with charterers unable to carry on making hire payments under charters made 
in happier times. For shipowners, the remedy of withdrawal now has the disadvantage 
that, once free of the old charter, the vessel will be refi xed at a rate considerably lower 
than under the old charter, together with the associated costs of completing bill of lading 
commitments entered into during the currency of the withdrawn charter. The focus now 
is on shipowners’ remedies after a withdrawal and here there have been three seminal 
decisions: that of the Court of Appeal in  Spar Shipping on recovery of damages from 
charterers following a withdrawal; that of the Supreme Court in  The Kos on recovery of 
post-withdrawal costs from charterers; and that of the Court of Appeal in  The Bulk Chile 
on recovery of such costs from third parties through recovery of freight due under the 
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bill of lading and through the exercise of the lien on sub-freights. This paper will start by 
examining the prospects of recovery from time charterers, before moving on to consider 
other targets, such as cargo owners and sub-charterers. 
 II.  CLAIMS AGAINST TIME CHARTERERS 
 (a) Damages claims 
 Withdrawal is an option to terminate and its exercise will not, in itself, give rise to any 
claim for damages.  1  The shipowner’s claim would be limited to hire outstanding at the 
date of withdrawal, together with interest. However, if the shipowner were entitled to 
terminate the contract for breach of the obligation to pay hire punctually, then damages 
would be recoverable. This depends on how the obligation to make punctual payment of 
hire is classifi ed. If it is a condition, then any breach will entitle the shipowner to terminate 
the charter and to claim damages in respect of the unexpired residue of the charter. If, 
on the other hand, the obligation is an innominate term, then the right to terminate will 
depend on whether the consequences of the breach are suffi ciently serious to go to the 
root of the contract so as to deprive the shipowner of substantially the whole benefi t of 
the charterparty. 
 Termination due to breach of condition? 
 Until recently, there was a fi rst instance split on this issue, with two decisions holding that 
the obligation to pay hire punctually was an innominate term, and one to the effect that 
it was a condition. First, there is  Tenax Steamship Co Ltd v The Brimnes (Owners) (The 
Brimnes) ,  2  where Brandon J held that, had the shipowners not been entitled to withdraw 
the vessel, they would not have been entitled to terminate for breach of the obligation to 
pay hire punctually, as that obligation was not a condition. Second, there is the contrary 
decision of Flaux J in  Kuwait Rocks Co v AMN Bulkcarriers Inc (The Astra) ,  3  that the 
obligation to make punctual payment of hire is a condition, at least where there is an 
anti-technicality provision in the withdrawal clause. Referring to  Bunge Corp, New York v 
Tradax Export SA, Panama ,  4  he identifi ed a general rule that time provisions in commercial 
contracts are conditions, a view supported by dicta of Lord Diplock in  Afovos Shipping Co 
SA v R Pagnan & Fratelli (The Afovos) .  5  Third, there is  Spar Shipping AS v Grand China 
1 . Financings Ltd v Baldock [1963] 2 QB 104. The case involved a hire-purchase agreement which contained 
an option to terminate in the event of breach. The Court of Appeal held that following termination, in the absence 
of repudiation, damages were limited to the overdue instalments and interest thereon. 
2 . [1972] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 465; [1973] 1 WLR 386;’ aff’d [1975] QB 929; [1974] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 241 (CA). The 
Court of Appeal upheld Brandon J’s decision that the shipowners had been entitled to withdraw the vessel but 
made no comment on the condition point. 
3 . [2013] EWHC 865 (Comm); [2013] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 69. 
4 . [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 1 (HL); [1981] 1 WLR 711. 
5 . [1983] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 335, 341; [1983] 1 WLR 195, 203: “The owners are to be at liberty to withdraw the 
vessel from the service of the charterers; in other words, they are entitled to treat the breach when it occurs as 
a breach of condition and so giving them the right to elect to treat it as putting an end to all their own primary 
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Logistics Holding (Group) Co Ltd ,  6  where Popplewell J declined to follow  The Astra . He 
held fi rst that, in the absence of clear language, a contractual termination clause, such as 
a withdrawal clause, was to be treated as an option to cancel which did not confer greater 
rights to damages at common law than would otherwise exist.  7  Second, the obligation to 
make punctual payment of hire is not a condition. The presumption in mercantile contracts 
was that time stipulations are not conditions, the opposite to that propounded by Flaux J. 
The general approach should be that, where predicated breaches of a term may have 
consequences ranging from the trivial to the serious, that is a strong indication that the 
term is to be treated as an innominate term. In addition, there was the fact that, for 40 years 
since  The Brimnes , owners and charterers had conducted business on the basis that hire is 
not a condition, or at the very least may not be. 
 The issue has now been settled by the Court of Appeal in  Spar Shipping ,  8  which has 
recently upheld Popplewell J’s decision that the obligation to pay hire under cl.11 of the 
NYPE charter was not a condition. The clause was a payment term and was not a condition 
precedent to the performance by Spar of their obligations under the charterparties in the 
same direct or immediate sense that the terms were interdependent in the sale of goods 
contract in  Bunge v Tradax . It could not be said that any failure to pay hire punctually in 
advance, no matter how trivial, would derail Spar’s performance under the charterparties. 
The true construction of the charters did not indicate that cl.11 was a condition. It did not 
expressly make time of the essence nor spell out the consequences of breach. It was quite 
clear “that the consequences of a breach of cl.11 can vary dramatically—from the trivial 
to the grave; in such circumstances it is one thing to give effect to an express contractual 
termination clause but quite another to treat that clause as a condition”.  9  Any presumption 
that time is of the essence in mercantile contracts did not apply generally to the time of 
payment unless the terms of the contract indicated a different intention. Nor did the anti-
technicality clause (cl.11(b)) strengthen the case for the timely payment of hire being a 
condition of the charterparties. 
 The decision may seem hard on the shipowner, given the critical importance to its 
business of the prompt payment of hire, but it is a straightforward matter to make specifi c 
contractual provision to turn this obligation into a condition. One such way is by expressly 
providing that time is of the essence with the obligation to pay hire, as is the case with 
cl.38.3 of the Barecon 2001 form of demise charter, which provides “time shall be of [the] 
essence”, which makes the obligation to pay hire a condition of the contract, subject to the 
period of grace.  10  Another way, as seen in cl.11(c) of the NYPE 2015 form, is by providing 
that owners are to be entitled to damages in the event of withdrawal for the loss of the 
remainder of the charterparty. Prior to the Supreme Court’s recent re-evaluation of penalty 
clauses in  Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi;  ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis (Consumers 
Association intervening) ,  11  this clause would probably have been rendered unenforceable, 
6 . [2015] EWHC 718 (Comm); [2015] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 407. The claim was made against the guarantors of the 
charterers and involved issues of the validity of the guarantee. 
7 . Applying Financings Ltd v Baldock [1963] 2 QB 104. 
8 . [2016] EWCA Civ 982; [2016] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 447. 
9 . Ibid, [55]. 
10 . Parbulk II A/S v Heritage Maritime Ltd SA (The Mahakam) [2011] EWHC 2917 (Comm); [2012] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 87. 
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as not being a genuine pre-estimate of the shipowner’s loss.  12  In determining whether a 
contractual provision was penal, the Supreme Court has held that the true test was whether 
it was a secondary obligation which imposed a detriment on the contract-breaker out of 
all proportion to any legitimate interest of the innocent party in the enforcement of the 
primary obligation. It is likely that cl.11(c) would satisfy this new test. 
 Termination due to repudiation or renunciation by the charterers 
 Spar Shipping establishes that the obligation to pay hire is an innominate term, not a 
condition. The innocent party’s right to terminate for breach of an innominate term 
depends upon whether the breach “goes to the root” of the contract or deprives the innocent 
party of substantially the whole benefi t of the contract.  13  A breach which has this effect is 
described as a repudiation. However, prospective breaches of the contract may also justify 
the innocent party in terminating the contract if the other party has shown an intention not 
to perform the contract according to its terms and that the effect of such refusal to perform 
will go to the root of the contract. Such a prospective breach is described as a renunciation 
or an anticipatory breach. In  Spar Shipping , Popplewell J found that, while the past 
failures to pay hire did not go to the root of the contract so as to justify the owners in 
terminating the charter, the charterers had evinced an intention not to make full payment of 
hire for future instalments, and that the effects of this would go to the root of the contract, 
so justifying the owners in terminating the contract.  14  This intention could be evidenced 
by past breaches which on their own would be insuffi cient to be repudiatory. The past 
breaches and the threatened future breaches when taken together would be repudiatory. 
Popplewell J held that persistent late payments over a period of fi ve months from April 
2011 evidenced a renunciation by the charterers, and stated:  15  
 “Occasional and brief delays in payment will not be repudiatory, but where the hire is due semi-
monthly in advance, regular delays measured in weeks often will be, because in those circumstances 
performance is substantially different from what has been bargained for, which is a charterparty 
under which the owner is to meet his obligations from the hire which has already been provided.” 
 The Court of Appeal upheld Popplewell J’s fi nding on renunciation. Hire was payable 
in advance to provide a fund from which shipowners could meet the expenses of rendering 
the services they have undertaken to provide under the charterparty. Shipowners were not 
obliged to perform the services on credit, but only against advance payment. The fi nancial 
strength of the particular shipowner had no bearing whatever on the nature of the bargain 
entered into. Adopting the formulation of anticipatory breach in  Universal Cargo Carriers 
12 . As was a similar provision in Financings v Baldock [1963] 2 QB 104. See too Lansat Shipping Co Ltd v 
Glencore Grain BV (The Paragon) [2009] EWCA Civ 855; [2009] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 688. 
13 . Hongkong Fir Shipping Co Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd [1962] 2 QB 26, 69–70; [1961] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep 478, 493, per Diplock LJ. 
14 . In The Astra [2013] EWHC 865 (Comm); [2013] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 69, Flaux J made a similar fi nding, 
upholding the tribunal’s fi nding that the charterers’ conduct in persistent failure to pay the full rate of hire 
amounted to a renunciation of the charter entitling the owners to terminate the charter and to claim damages. 
15 . [2015] EWHC 718 (Comm); [2015] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 407, [214]. In The Brimnes [1972] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 465; 
[1973] 1 WLR 386, Brandon J found that the delays by a varying number of days in 13 payments of hire did not 
amount to repudiation of the contract by the charterers. This may be viewed as a remarkably generous assessment 
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Corp v Citati ,  16  a reasonable shipowner could have no realistic expectation that charterers 
would in the future pay hire punctually in advance. Charterers admitted that they were 
in diffi culty owing to market conditions and therefore their future performance turned 
on market vicissitudes.  17  This prospective non-performance would unilaterally convert a 
contract for payment in advance into a transaction for unsecured credit and without any 
provision for the payment of interest. An evinced intention not to pay hire punctually in 
the future is very different from a failure to pay a single instalment of hire punctually. The 
Court of Appeal rejected charterers’ argument that an arithmetical comparison between 
the arrears and the total sums payable over the life of the charters showed that owners 
would not be deprived of substantially the whole benefi t of the charterparties. “[T]his 
submission simply does not grapple with the nature and importance of the bargain for the 
payment of hire in advance.”  18  
 (b) Indemnity claims 
 Following withdrawal, the shipowner may well be faced with additional costs due to the 
presence on board the vessel of cargo loaded pursuant to the charterer’s orders prior to the 
withdrawal. Can such costs be recoverable from the time charterer under the indemnity, 
express or implied,  19  in respect of costs incurred in following the orders of the charterer 
regarding the employment of the vessel? Prior to 2012 there had been no suggestion that 
post-withdrawal costs could be recoverable through the indemnity. The question had arisen 
in  Tropwood AG of Zug v Jade Enterprises Ltd (The Tropwind) (No 2) ,  20  in which Robert 
Goff J had held that, following the withdrawal, the charterers, by requesting the owners to 
fulfi l the existing bill of lading commitments, had become liable to compensate them on the 
basis of a quantum meruit at the market rate. On appeal,  21  it was held that there had been 
no effective withdrawal and the charter continued, with hire being payable, until redelivery 
on conclusion of the fi nal voyage. Lord Denning MR was of the view that, had there been 
an effective withdrawal, the owners would have had no claim against the time charterers: 
 “Even if the notice of withdrawal were effective by itself without more, I cannot see any basis on 
which the shipowners could recover any sum from the charterers … If there is cargo on board at the 
time of the notice of withdrawal—and the shipowner carries it to its destination—he does so by way 
of fulfi lling the original charter or bill of lading—and not by way of any new request by the charterer. 
So he cannot recover the market rate either on a quantum meruit or otherwise”.  22  
16 . [1957] 2 QB 401, 436; [1957] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 174, 193. 
17 . A similar fi nding may be made where there is a persistent pattern of under-payment of hire under a sub 
time charter. In London Arbitration 29/16 (2016) 966 LMLN 3, the disponent owner obtained damages for 
renunciation and the tribunal rejected the argument that there should be no award of damages as it would have 
been unable to perform the charter, as the owners had withdrawn from the head charter owing to the disponent 
owner’s failure to pay hire. 
18 . Spar Shipping [2016] EWCA Civ 982; [2016] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 447, [87], per Gross LJ. 
19 . An indemnity will be implied into a time charter against the consequences of complying with charterers’ 
orders as to the employment of the vessel: Triad Shipping Co v Stellar Chartering & Brokerage Inc (The Island 
Archon) [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 277 (CA). 
20 . [1981] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 45 (QB). 
21 . [1982] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 232 (CA). 
22 . Ibid, 237. Lord Denning MR was of the view, wrongly, that a withdrawal could not be effected “[i]f they 
allow the vessel to remain in the service of the charterers, fulfi lling contracts of carriage which the charterers 
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 A post-withdrawal indemnity claim was made in  ENE Kos 1 Ltd v Petroleo Brasileiro SA 
(The Kos) (No 2).  23  The vessel was withdrawn at Angra dos Reis in Brazil, having loaded 
part of a cargo belonging to the time charterers. At this stage loading had not completed 
and no bills of lading had been issued. Following withdrawal, the cargo then had to be 
discharged at the loading port, which took 2.64 days. The charterers threatened to arrest the 
vessel for wrongful withdrawal and the shipowners provided a guarantee for $18,000,000. 
The shipowners claimed from the charterers by way of indemnity: (a) compensation at 
the market rate  24  for the use or detention of the ship between notice of withdrawal and 
discharge of the cargo, totalling 2.64 days; (b) for fuel consumed during that time; and 
(c) for the costs of providing and maintaining the guarantee. The owners’ indemnity 
claim was rejected at fi rst instance and in the Court of Appeal on the ground that the post-
withdrawal costs had been incurred by reason of the shipowner’s decision to exercise its 
option to withdraw, rather than as a result of the prior orders as regards the cargo to be loaded. 
However, the Supreme Court, Lord Mance dissenting, held that all three claims could be 
recovered under the indemnity.  25  The key question was whether the charterers’ order was 
an effective cause of the owner’s having to bear a risk or cost of a kind which he had not 
contractually agreed to bear. The charterer’s order did not have to be the only cause of the 
loss. The Supreme Court found that the charterers’ order to load the parcel of cargo which 
was on board the vessel when it was withdrawn was the effective cause of the shipowner’s 
loss. Lord Sumption stated:   26  
 “The need to discharge the cargo in the owners’ time arose from the combination of two factors, 
namely (i) that the cargo had been loaded, and (ii) that the purpose for which it had been loaded (ie 
carriage under the charterparty to its destination) had come to an end with the termination of the 
charterparty. In other words, the cargo which charterers had ordered the vessel to load was still on 
board when the charterparty came to an end. On any realistic view, this was because the charterers 
had put it there.” 
 Although it was only because of the withdrawal of the vessel that the subsequent 
discharge of the cargo had to be done in the owners’ time and without earning contractual 
hire, that was the very reason why the detention of the vessel fell within the indemnity. The 
owners had not assumed the risk of discharging the cargo in their own time following a 
withdrawal. Lord Mance dissented on this point, taking the same view as the lower courts: 
“[t]he owners were not performing the charterers’ instructions and they were not receiving 
hire for the time wasted prior to discharge. The ‘direct’ or ‘unbroken’ causal link required 
by the authorities is lacking”.  27  The loss was not caused by compliance with the owners’ 
instructions, but rather because the charter was at an end. 
 In  The Kos no bills of lading had been issued and there was no question of the cargo’s 
being carried to its intended destination after the withdrawal. The case was unusual in 
that the cargo loaded belonged to the charterer. The more common situation following 
23 . [2009] EWHC 1843 (Comm); [2010] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 87; varied [2010] EWCA Civ 772; [2010] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep 409; rvsd [2012] UKSC 17; [2012] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 292; [2012] 2 AC 164. 
24 . At the time, June 2008, the market rate was some three and a half times the charter hire. 
25 . [2012] UKSC 17; [2012] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 292; [2012] 2 AC 164. 
26 . Ibid, [13]. 
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a withdrawal would be that the cargo would belong to third-party shippers who had the 
expectation of freight prepaid bills of lading being issued by the shipowner on completion 
of loading. In this situation, might the shipowners be able to claim under the indemnity 
for the costs of performing the bill of lading voyage? On the indemnity analysis adopted 
by four Justices of the Supreme Court, the costs of performing such a voyage would be 
recoverable under the time charterer’s indemnity, whether express or implied, as being 
costs consequent upon the time charterer’s order to load the cargo and to issue bills of 
lading, marked “freight prepaid”, so precluding recovery of freight from the holders of 
the bills. Even the dissenting Justice, Lord Mance, was of the view that the indemnity 
might be engaged in this situation, leading to charterers having to pay owners the market 
rate: “Further, if owners were left with no practical option but to carry the cargo to its 
destination, then they might still have an argument that their time and money were spent 
‘in compliance with the time charterers’ instructions’.”  28  
 III. REMEDIES AGAINST BILL OF LADING HOLDERS 
AND SUB-CHARTERERS 
 (a) Contractual claims under the bill of lading 
 Following a withdrawal, the shipowner may also seek to recover its costs from other parties 
involved in the carriage of the cargo left on board at the time of the termination of the time 
charter. Where the cargo is in the process of being loaded when the vessel is withdrawn, 
the immediate question arises whether the shipowner may cease loading and discharge the 
cargo on board at the port of loading, as happened in  The Kos , where the partly loaded 
cargo belonged to the time charterer. The answer will depend on the law of the contract 
between the shipowner and the shipper that will come into existence at the start of loading, 
which will be determined by the law of the place of loading.  29  
 Under English law, it is likely that there will be an implied contract between the shippers 
and the shipowners which starts when loading begins and that contract will be on the terms 
of the bill of lading that will be issued on completion of loading, including terms relating 
to applicable law and jurisdiction.  30  Accordingly, once loading starts, the shipowners will 
be contractually obliged to complete loading. That contract will be on the terms of the bill 
28 . Ibid, [50]. 
29 . Where the place of loading is in a Member State of the EU, the law to be applied to this issue will be 
determined by Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the 
law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I). Article 10 provides:“1. The existence and validity of a contract, 
or of any term of a contract, shall be determined by the law which would govern it under this Regulation if the 
contract or term were valid. 2. Nevertheless, a party, in order to establish that he did not consent, may rely upon the 
law of the country in which he has his habitual residence if it appears from the circumstances that it would not be 
reasonable to determine the effect of his conduct in accordance with the law specifi ed in paragraph 1.” 
30 . Pyrene Co Ltd v Scindia Navigation Co Ltd [1954] 2 QB 402, 426; [1954] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 321, 333, per 
Devlin J: “There is an alternative way by which, on the facts of this case, the same result would be achieved. 
By delivering the goods alongside the seller impliedly invited the shipowner to load them, and the shipowner 
by lifting the goods impliedly accepted that invitation. The implied contract so created must incorporate the 
shipowner’s usual terms; none other could have been contemplated; the shipowner would not contract for the 
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of lading which the charterer has agreed will be issued by the shipowner on completion of 
loading.  31  Where these are to be “freight prepaid” bills, the shipowner will be contractually 
obliged to fulfi l the bill of lading voyage without being able to recover anything from third-
party bill of lading holders. As regards the shipper, the factual matrix may indicate that there 
is no undertaking to pay freight, and this will be the case where the bill of lading contains 
no freight clauses of its own and does not incorporate the terms of any charterparty.  32  
Agreements with the holders of such bills for contributions towards the costs of performing 
the voyage are likely to be voidable for economic duress, as any such agreement is likely to 
have been made in response to an illegitimate threat not to perform the voyage.  33  
 The obligation to pay freight under the bill of lading is likely to arise through the 
incorporation into the bill of lading of the terms of a charter. Where the shipowner has 
concluded a voyage charter, the bill of lading will generally incorporate the terms of that 
charter, so giving the shipowner additional security for payment of sums due under the 
charter, and, where there is a cesser clause, enabling the transfer of the obligations under 
the charter from the charterer to the bill of lading holder. Where the vessel is on time 
charter, it will be the time charterer who makes the contracts of carriage for the voyages 
covered by the bills of lading, and under most forms of time charter the charterer will 
have control over the forms in which those bills of lading are to be issued. The time 
charterer may well wish to secure payment from the sub-charterer and will achieve this 
by requiring the shipowner to issue a bill of lading incorporating the terms of the sub-
charterer. The time charterer’s remedies, such as the lien on cargo, will be exercisable 
through the shipowner under this separate contract with the sub-charterer shipper under 
the bill of lading. The employment clause will entitle the time charterer to give orders to 
the shipowner to exercise its lien on cargo under the contract contained in or evidenced 
by the bill of lading.  34  The presence of “freight prepaid” wording on the bill of lading will 
estop the shipowner from exercising its contractual right to freight, or to exercise a lien 
over the cargo for outstanding freight, as against parties other than the person liable to pay 
freight under the incorporated charter—generally the shipper under the bill of lading.  35  
 A peculiarity of a bill of lading contract which incorporates a sub-, or sub-sub-, charter 
is that the obligation to pay freight is not owed to the shipowner, but to the time charterer; 
so how can the shipowner require payment to himself? The shipowner’s rights to freight 
31 . The time charterer will be able to procure a bill of lading in its chosen form, such as one claused “freight 
prepaid” by reason of the common time charter provision that the master is to sign bills of lading as presented. 
The clause will give the time charterer implied authority to sign the bills of lading itself on behalf of the master. 
W&R Fletcher (New Zealand) v Sigurd Haavik A/S (The Vikfrost) [1980] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 560 (CA). This authority 
should also extend to the creation of the contract between the shipper and the shipowner on the terms of the bill 
of lading that it is anticipated will be issued on shipment. 
32 . Cho Yang Shipping Co Ltd v Coral (UK) Ltd [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 641 (CA). 
33 . Vantage Navigation Corp v Suhail and Saud Bahwan Building Material (The Alev) [1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 
138 (QB). 
34 . Castleton Commodities Shipping Co Pte Ltd v Silver Rock Investments Inc (The Clipper Monarch) [2015] 
EWHC 2584 (Comm); [2016] 1 Lloyd’s Law Rep 1. 
35 . Freight was claimed from the shipper under “freight prepaid” bills of lading incorporating the terms of 
a sub-charter in India Steamship Co Ltd v Louis Dreyfus Sugar Ltd (The Indian Reliance) [1997] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 
52 (QB) and Dry Bulk Handy Holding Inc v Fayette International Holdings Ltd (The Bulk Chile) [2012] EWHC 
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under the bill of lading, and their relationship with their claims under the time charter, 
were considered in  Wehner v Dene Steam Shipping Co .  36  A shipowner’s bill of lading 
had been issued providing for the payment of freight on right and true delivery. The time 
charterers were in default and the shipowner gave notice to the sub-charterer’s agents at the 
port of discharge that freight under the bill of lading was to be paid for the account of the 
shipowner. Channell J held that this was correct, as the bill of lading was a contract with 
the shipowner, and the sub-charterer’s agents were also to be regarded as the agents of the 
shipowner for the purposes of collecting freight under the bill of lading. The shipowners 
would be entitled to retain the amount due from the time charterers, as at the date of giving 
notice to the agents that payment was to be made to them, and to account for any surplus 
to the time charterer or sub-charterer as the case may be. 
 This analysis has been carried through into the more common situation where the time 
charterer instructs the shipowner to issue bills of lading incorporating the terms of either 
its sub-charter, or of a sub-sub-charter. In  The Indian Reliance ,  37  Rix J, as he then was, held 
that the time charterer was constituted the shipowner’s agent for receipt of freights under 
the bill of lading.  38  This was on the basis of the employment clause in the time charter.  39  
Payment to the agent would be treated as payment to the shipowner. Accordingly, payment 
to the time charterers of the 95% freight due under the sub-charter incorporated into the 
bill of lading prior to the shipowner’s giving notice to the sub-charterer/shipper discharged 
its liability to the shipowner under the bill of lading to that extent. 
 The shipowner’s right to claim freight under such a bill of lading might be problematic 
in that the incorporated charter will direct payment to the disponent owner. Rix J was of 
the view that the incorporation of the charter provision specifying the nominated account 
for payment of freight should be treated as making the freight due to the owners, but 
payable to the time charterer:  40  
 “The effect of such payment would be that owners could not thereafter seek to claim freight a second 
time or seek to lien cargo on the basis of freight going still unpaid. If, however, owners intervened to 
claim the freight before it was paid to the nominated account, then they would be in time to intercept it.” 
In  The Spiros C ,  41  the issue resurfaced with the bill of lading shipper arguing that a debt 
payable to a third party cannot be sued for as a debt by the promisee: Rix LJ despatched 
that argument as follows:  42  
36 . [1905] 2 KB 92 (QB). 
37 . [1997] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 52 (QB). 
38 . This is not the case where the head charter is a voyage charter. Thus, in Compania Comercial y Naviera 
San Martin SA v China National Foreign Trade Transportation Corp (The Constanza M) [1980] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 
505 (aff’d [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 147 (CA)) the sub-charterer’s payment to the head charterer did not discharge 
its liability for freight under the bill of lading which incorporated the terms of the head charter—under which 
freight had not been paid. 
39 . See Wehner v Dene [1905] 2 KB 92 (QB) in which Channell J had found to this effect by reason of the 
standard employment clause which provided that the captain was to sign bills of lading at any rate of freight that 
may be directed by the charterer. 
40 . [1997] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 52 (QB), 58. 
41 . Tradigrain SA v King Diamond Shipping SA (The Spiros C) [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 319. 
42 . Ibid, 331 [56]. The Court of Appeal held that deductions from freight agreed by the time charterer with 
the shipper prior to the shipowner’s intervention could not be recovered by the shipowner under the contract 
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 “Prima facie that might seem to be correct, but as  Chitty remarks in the passage at para 19-044 cited 
by Mr Males: ‘The objection loses much of its force if the promisor would not in fact be prejudiced 
by having to pay the promisee rather than the third party’.” 
 There is then a reference in footnote 97 to para 19-060, where the following appears: 
 “‘But the question whether the promisee [the owner] can unilaterally (ie without the consent of 
the promisor) [Tradigrain] demand that payment be made to himself depends once again on the 
construction of the contract. If the contract can be construed as one to pay the third party “or as the 
promisee shall direct” then the promisee is entitled to demand payment to himself’.” 
 In Rix LJ’s view, a bill of lading in which freight was payable as per charterparty was 
probably such a contract. This view was subsequently endorsed by the Court of Appeal 
in  Dry Bulk Handy Holding Inc and another v Fayette International Holdings Ltd and 
Another (The Bulk Chile) ,  43  in which they held that the shipowner does have the right to 
redirect to itself payment of the freight due under the charter incorporated in the bill of 
lading. The case involved default under a time charter, in which the time charterer then 
went into liquidation in South Korea. The owners then sought to claim sub-hires from the 
trip sub-charterer, Fayette, and sub-sub-freight from the sub-sub-charterer, and shipper 
under the bill of lading, Metinvest. The three bills of lading provided for “Freight payable 
as per [the voyage charterparty]” and were marked “freight prepaid”. After the time 
charterer, KLC, had failed to pay hire, shipowners gave notice of lien on 1 February to 
Metinvest and Fayette.  44  The following day the vessel started loading cargo at Sevastopol, 
the fi rst of her two loading ports. On 5 February owners gave a second notice of lien to 
Metinvest and Fayette, stating that the lien extended to “cargo now on loaded on board … 
to be carried under bills of lading numbers …”. On 8 February loading completed and the 
bills of lading were issued to Metinvest, as shipper. On 26 February owners withdrew from 
the KLC charter. On 1 March Fayette gave owners notice of redelivery and on 5 March 
they instructed the master to proceed to the bill of lading destination ports and fulfi l the 
delivery obligations under bills of lading. On 10 March the cargo was delivered and on 
April 2011 Metinvest paid freight to Fayette of US$2,591,291.99. 
 The owners claimed against Metinvest for freight under the bill of lading.  45  Andrew 
Smith J held that the owners were entitled to recover the freight, provided that they gave 
notice to Metinvest before they had paid the freight to Fayette.  46  Although the notice given 
had been titled “Notice of Lien”, the second request in it made clear that it also required 
payment of freight due under the bill of lading direct to the shipowner. The right to freight 
subsisted notwithstanding that the charter referred to in the bill of lading specifi ed payment 
43 . [2012] EWHC 2107 (Comm); [2012] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 594; affd [2013] EWCA Civ 184; [2013] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep 38; [2013] 1 WLR 3440. 
44 . The notice stated that Metinvest and Fayette : “are kindly required to treat this message as Notice of Lien 
over any balance of freight(s) and/or hire(s) due under any charters, bills of lading, or other contracts of carriage 
relating to the voyage(s) and cargo(es) covered by the above bills of lading”, and that the addressees were 
requested to: “(1) Confi rm to us the amount of freight(s) and/or hire(s) due from you under any charters, bills of 
lading, or other contracts of carriage relating to the voyage(s) and cargo(es) covered by the bills of lading; and (2) 
Arrange payment of all such freight(s) and/or hire(s) in your hands directly to our account when due, as below”. 
45 . The owners also claimed freight from Metinvest and Fayette by way of a lien on sub-freight and against 
Fayette for quantum meruit hire. These claims are discussed later in this paper. 
46 . In this case, the charter required payment of freight, but did not specify a payee, and it was presumed that 
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of freight to a third party, not to the shipowner. The full freight due could be claimed by 
giving notice to the shippers at any time prior to their paying the charterer, and this right 
did not depend on any sums being due to the shipowner under the time charter. The Court 
of Appeal endorsed this analysis, Tomlinson LJ stating:  47  
 “the nominated recipient is, as between the shipowner and the shipper, to be regarded as the 
shipowner’s agent. … I cannot see why the shipowner’s contract with the shipper should be taken 
to preclude the shipowner from cancelling his nominated agent’s authority to act on his behalf in 
receiving the freight, before such payment has been made, and requiring it to be made to himself. … 
It follows that I see no diffi culty in the shipowner countermanding his direction to the shipper to pay 
freight to a third party provided of course that he does so before the shipper has made the payment 
as initially directed.” 
 It made no difference that the fi rst notice was given before loading of cargo started and 
before the issue of any bill of lading, Tomlinson LJ observing:   48  
 “I can see no basis upon which the shipowner can be prevented from stipulating in advance the terms 
upon which he would be prepared to enter into a contract of carriage with the shippers. Indeed, that 
might be thought less objectionable than countermanding after their issue the direction given in the 
bills of lading.” 
 The claim to freight was not limited to the amount due from the head charterer. If there 
were a surplus of freight over the shipowner’s claim, that would have to be held for the 
account of the head charterer.  49  This might create diffi culties if the time charterer were 
insolvent, but in the present case the problem did not arise. The owners had undertaken 
to the court that they would not enforce their judgment against Metinvest for the full 
amount of the freight, US$2.18 million, for a sum greater than US$1,339,625.93, which 
was the combined total of hire due and unpaid under the head charter and the amount 
of remuneration to which the owners were entitled from Fayette consequent upon their 
implied request that the owners should continue to make the vessel available to Fayette 
following the withdrawal. Furthermore, the shipowner can intervene and claim the bill of 
lading freight even when there is no default under the head charter, although Tomlinson 
LJ regarded it as arguable that a time charterer could restrain the shipowner from claiming 
freight in these circumstances “on the simple ground that until such time as the charterer 
is in default the shipowner has, by reason of clause 8 of the NYPE Form, or a similar 
employment clause, agreed to delegate collection of freight to the charterer”.  50  
 There are some problems with this analysis. First, it will be the time charterer who 
has instructed the shipowner to issue bills of lading incorporating the sub-charterer, with 
a view to protecting its rights against the sub-charterer, rather than to creating a parallel 
contractual right to those sub-freights under the contract contained in or evidenced by the 
bill of lading. Although this will create a contract between the shipowner and the shipper, 
the freight due will be determined by the terms of the incorporated charter. The construction 
of the payment instructions in the incorporated charter so as to pay the charterer or as 
47 . [2013] EWCA Civ 184; [2013] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 38; [2013] 1 WLR 3440, [25]. 
48 . Ibid, [32]. 
49 . Wehner v Dene [1905] 2 KB 92 (QB). 
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the shipowner may direct would have to be read back into the charter itself, a separate 
contract that will pre-date the bill of lading incorporating it. Second, assuming that the 
bill of lading does give the shipowner the right to direct payment of sub-freights to itself, 
the obligation to account for any surplus received when the bill of lading incorporates a 
sub-sub-charter should surely be owed to the disponent owner under the sub-charter, to 
whom the freight is contractually due, rather than to the time charterer, to whom it is not.  51  
Third, consideration needs to be given to the mechanism by which the shipper’s payment 
of freight to the shipowner would discharge its obligation to pay freight to the disponent 
owner under its charterparty. This could be achieved by implying a term into a voyage 
charter that provides for the issue of shipowners’ bills of lading incorporating the freight 
provisions of the voyage charter, that a payment to the shipowner under the bill of lading 
will discharge the obligation to pay the disponent owner freight under the voyage charter. 
 (b) Non-contractual claims against cargo owners 
 In  The Kos ,  52  the shipowners advanced their claim for recovery of costs and time incurred 
in the post-withdrawal period on the alternative ground of a non-contractual bailment. 
Relying on  China Pacifi c SA v Food Corpn of India ( The Winson ),  53  Andrew Smith J 
allowed the shipowners to recover both reasonable expenses and reasonable remuneration. 
Although the claim in  The Winson was only for reasonable expenses incurred by the 
shipowner, the principle set out by Lord Diplock—that the bailor’s liability arises because 
he had enjoyed the benefi t of the bailee’s services—justifi ed the recovery of reasonable 
remuneration in respect of the bailee’s performance of its duty to hold the cargo available to 
the bailor.  54  The Court of Appeal reversed the decision in part, allowing only the reasonable 
expenses incurred by the shipowner. Longmore LJ found that remuneration would require 
an express or implied agreement, which was not present here; the shipowners were doing 
no more than required of a gratuitous bailee in the post-withdrawal period. 
 The Supreme Court unanimously reinstated the fi ndings of Andrew Smith J and allowed 
the shipowners to recover quantum meruit remuneration for the 2.64 days between 
withdrawal and the time the ship sailed away. There had been a consensual bailment of the 
charterers’ cargo, which ceased to be contractual following the withdrawal, after which 
owners owed a continuing duty to take reasonable care of the cargo until arrangements had 
been made for its discharge. The principle derived from cases which had described it as 
arising out of an agency of necessity of the carrier.  55  Lord Sumption stated:  56  
51 . In Wehner v Dene [1905] 2 KB 92, 99, Channell J spoke of any surplus being accounted for to the time 
charterer or the sub-charterer, as the case might be. Coghlin, Baker, Kenny, Kimball, Belknap, Time Charters, 
7th edn (Informa, London, 2014), [30.79] suggests that “The better view is that the owners’ obligation to account 
arises from an implied term of the time charter, and is therefore owed only to the charterers”. 
52 . [2009] EWHC 1843 (Comm); [2010] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 87; varied [2010] EWCA Civ 772; [2010] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep 409; rvsd [2012] UKSC 17; [2012] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 292; [2012] 2 AC 164. 
53 . [1982] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 117; [1982] AC 939. 
54 . In his note on the decision ([2010] LMCLQ 226, 231) Professor Gerard McMeel made the point that the 
assessment of that benefi t might have to be on a land-based storage facility rate. 
55 . Gaudet v Brown (Cargo ex Argos) (1873) LR 5 PC 134 and Great Northern Railway Co v Swaffi eld 
(1874) LR 9 Ex 132. 
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 “The decisive point, and the sense in which the word ‘necessity’ is used in these cases, is that if the 
bailee is in a position where he has no way of discharging his responsibility to care for the goods 
without incurring loss or expense, then the loss or expense is for the account of the goods-owner.” 
 Lord Sumption also considered that this principle would justify a claim to remuneration 
where the claimant stored and handled the goods with his own facilities:  57  
 “The opportunity cost of retaining the vessel in Angra dos Reis while the charterers’ cargo remained 
on board was a true cost even if it was not an out of pocket expense.” 
 The Kos involved a situation where a contractual bailment came to an end and was 
replaced by a gratuitous bailment. Bailment will also be relevant where goods are carried 
under a non-contractual bailment, which will be the case when the shipowner carries goods 
for which charterers’ bills have been issued. The shipowner will be under no obligation to 
complete the bill of lading voyage but will owe the owners of the cargo a duty as bailee to 
take reasonable care of the cargo while it is in their custody.  58  If the shipowners perform 
the voyage, it is possible that a claim for freight may lie against the shipper, even if the 
bill is a freight prepaid bill. Such a claim was advanced in  Ngo Chew Hong Edible Oil 
Pte Ltd v Scindia Steam Naviagion Co Ltd (The Jalamohan) ,  59  although it failed once the 
bills were found to be shipowners’ bills. The Supreme Court’s reasoning in  The Kos would 
suggest that a claim for remuneration could be advanced by the shipowner who carried 
the cargo to its destination under a charterer’s bill, without the necessity for acting under 
any express or implied request. This was the view of Andrew Smith J in  The Bulk Chile . 
Had there been no contractual claim to freight under the bill of lading, compensation could 
have been claimed from Metinvest on the basis of a quantum meruit. The bailee is entitled 
to recover in respect of carriage of bailed cargo if that is “the best and cheapest way 
of making [it] available to the [bailor]”.  60  Here owners took the only course reasonably 
and practically open to them when they carried the cargo to Malaysia and Indonesia and 
delivered it there. 
 A claim for remuneration on a quantum meruit basis may also arise if a third party 
requests the shipowners to perform the bill of lading voyage. This was the case in  Mutual 
Export Corp v Australian Express Ltd (The Lakatoi Express) ,  61  where the sub-charterers 
requested that the owners perform the voyage in the charterer’s bill of lading. Similarly, 
a right to remuneration will arise against a charterer down the chain if they intervene and 
request the shipowner to fulfi l its carriage and delivery obligations under a shipowner’s bill 
57 . Ibid, [29]. Two other grounds were canvassed: a new contract arising between shipowners and time 
charterers as regards discharge of the cargo, but this was rejected; a claim in restitution which was viewed as 
possible, but Lord Sumption considered it unnecessary to express a view on it. The claim would probably be one 
for a reasonable remuneration for free acceptance of a benefi t. 
58 . Sunrise Maritime Inc v Uvisco Ltd (The Hector) [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 287. By contrast, there is the 
Australian decision in Gadsden Pty Ltd v Strider 1 Ltd (The AES Express) (1990) 20 NSWLR 57 that, following 
a withdrawal, the shipowner takes over the charterers’ obligations under the charterers’ bills of lading. 
59 . [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 443. In The AES Express (1990) 20 NSWLR 57 the shipowner was unable to claim 
freight under the charterers’ bills of lading as it had already been paid to the charterer. 
60 . Cargo ex Argos (1872) LR 5 PC 134, 165, per Sir Montague Smith. 
61 . (1990) 19 NSWLR 285. Carruthers J held that the sub-charterers were obliged to pay the shipowner a 
reasonable remuneration for the use of the vessel after the repudiation, and sub-charterers could then claim this 
as damages against the time charterer. However, the shipowners obtained no right to lien the cargo in respect of 
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of lading. This was the case in  The Bulk Chile , where Andrew Smith J, whose decision was 
upheld in the Court of Appeal, found that the shipowner would be entitled to remuneration 
on a quantum meruit basis from Fayette based on their notice of redelivery of 1 March and 
their request of 5 March that the cargo be carried to its destination, notwithstanding that 
this was a service that the shipowners were obliged to perform under the bill of lading.  62  
 IV. RIGHTS OF LIENS UNDER THE TIME CHARTER 
 Most time charters will provide the shipowner with two rights of lien. The fi rst is a lien 
on cargo, a possessory right to retain possession of the cargo pending payment of sums 
due under the charter. This will be either a common law lien for freight due on right and 
true delivery of the cargo, and for general average, or a contractual lien for sums due 
under the charterparty,  63  which will affect the bill of lading holder only if the bill of lading 
incorporates the provisions of the charter. The second is a right to lien sub-freights or 
sub-hires, which operates by entitling the shipowner to intercept payments due to the time 
charterer under sub-charters before payment has been made thereunder. 
 (a) The lien on cargo 
 The right to lien the cargo on board the vessel is of limited value in the usual situation where 
the time charterer is not the owner of the cargo loaded onto the vessel. For the contractual 
lien to be effective against the cargo owner, its provisions need to be incorporated into 
the bill of lading.  64  Absent such incorporation, any denial of possession of the cargo will 
amount to a conversion as well as a breach of the contract under the bill of lading. The 
lien on cargo may be made effective against the third-party owner of the cargo through the 
terms of the bill of lading itself, or through the incorporation into the bill of lading of the 
terms of the charter, be it the time charter or a sub-charter, that provides for a lien to be 
exercised over the cargo in respect of claims under that charter.  65  However, the statement 
“freight prepaid” in a bill of lading will estop the shipowner from exercising any right of 
lien as against a bill of lading holder which is not also a party to the charter incorporated 
in the bill of lading. 
62 . The owners also claimed compensation from Fayette in restitution on the ground of their free acceptance 
of a benefi t. Andrew Smith J considered (at [82]) that English law probably did provide quantum meruit relief 
for “freely accepted” services but, although Fayette had received a benefi t from the performance of the bill of 
lading contracts, there had been no free acceptance. Fayette were in no position to prevent CSAV from carrying 
out their obligations under the bills of lading contracts. 
63 . See, eg, cl.18 of the NYPE 1946 form. 
64 . As regards the time charterer, there are confl icting fi rst instance decisions as to whether the cargo may be 
liened when the charterer is not the owner of the cargo. In Aegnoussiotis Shipping Corp of Monrovia v Kristian 
Jebsens Rederi of Bergen AS (The Aegnoussiotis) [1977] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 268, Donaldson J held that the exercise 
of a lien in such circumstances was valid against the charterer. Mocatta J had previously found to the contrary 
in Steelwood Carriers of Monrovia v Evimeria Compania Naviera SA of Panama (The Agios Giorgis) [1976] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep 192. 
65 . If a lien subsists, the shipowner will also be able to claim the cost of exercising it: Metall Market OOO v 
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 (b) The lien on sub-freights 
 The lien on sub-freights is a right of the shipowner to require payment to him by the sub-
charterer of sub-freights in the event of sums being due to him under the head charter.  66  
It is exercisable by giving notice to the sub-charterer before payment is made to the head 
charterer.  67  The lien may also be expressed to apply to sub-hires but there is a divergence 
of fi rst-instance authority as to whether a lien on sub-freights extends to sub-hires. In  Care 
Shipping Corp v Latin American Shipping Corp (The Cebu) ,  68  it was held that sub-hires 
were subject to the lien, but in  Itex Itagrani Export SA v Care Shipping Corporation and 
Others (The Cebu) (No 2) ,  69  it was held that they were not. In  The Bulk Chile , Andrew 
Smith J, albeit reluctantly, followed the second of these decisions and held that the lien 
on sub-freights did not extend to sub-hires, but was exigible against the freight due from 
Metinvest under their charter with Fayette. The right may be exercised in respect of freight, 
or hire, due from a sub-sub-charterer if the sub-charter contains a lien on sub-freights or 
sub-hire.  70  The shipowner may, therefore, exercise his lien against multiple parties, sub-
charterers, and sub-sub-charterers by virtue of the equitable assignments effected by the 
lien clauses in the chain of charters. However, where a charter in the chain does not contain 
a lien clause, there can be no lien on freights due under sub-charters below that charter.  71  
 Judicial opinion is also divided as to how the lien on sub-freights operates.  72  There have 
been a series of fi rst instance decisions in which it has been categorised as an equitable 
assignment.  73  In  The  Western Moscow ,  74  Christopher Clarke J held that it operates by way 
of equitable assignment by way of charge, noting, “Further, if the right is only some form 
of sui generis contractual right, it is one of restricted use. It would give the owners no 
66 . The lien clause will usually provide for a lien for any sums due under the charter, as is the case with 
cl.18 of NYPE 1946. This would mean that the lien should be exercisible in respect of a claim for damages for 
renunciation by the time charterer. The proposition was asserted by owners in Western Bulk Shipowning III A/S v 
Carbofer Maritime Trading ApS (The Western Moscow) [2012] EWHC 1224 (Comm); [2012] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 163, 
[30–31] but the issue did not need to be decided as the sub-freights claimed were lower than the amount of the 
shipowner’s damages claim for renunciation. 
67 . The lien may be defeated by a prohibition on assignment in the sub-charter. The issue was adverted to, 
but not decided, in Cosco Bulk Carrier Co Ltd v Armada Shipping SA [2011] EWHC 216 (Ch); [2011] 2 All 
ER (Comm) 481, [30] and in Western Bulk Shipowning III A/S v Carbofer Maritime Trading ApS (The Western 
Moscow) [2012] EWHC 1224 (Comm); [2012] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 163, [73]. 
68 . [1983] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 302. 
69 . [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 316. Many charters will now provide for the lien to lie against all sub-freights and 
sub-hires, as is the case with line 260 of NYPE 1993. 
70 . The Cebu [1983] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 302 (QB); The Western Moscow [2012] EWHC 1224 (Comm); [2012] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep 163, [61], Christopher Clarke J holding that this is the effect of the charter clause giving a lien on 
“all subhires”. 
71 . As was the case in The Western Moscow [2012] EWHC 1224 (Comm); [2012] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 163. 
72 . The view that the lien creates an equitable charge derives from dicta of Lord Russell of Killowen in 
Federal Commerce & Navigation Co Ltd v Molena Alpha Inc (The Nanfri) [1979] AC 757, 784; [1979] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep 201, 210, and has been applied at fi rst instance in Re Welsh Irish Ferries Ltd (The Ugland Trailer) [1986] 
Ch 471; [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 372; Annangel Glory Compania Naviera S.A. v M.Golodetz Ltd, Middle East 
Marketing (UK) Ltd and Clive Rober Hammond (The Annangel Glory) [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 45 and The Cebu 
(No 2) [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 316. 
73 . The assignment in the time charter will operate as an agreement to transfer choses in action that have not 
yet come into existence—the rights to freight under future sub-charters. The effect in equity of this agreement 
is that when the chose in action does come into existence, a trust is constituted over the chose in action by the 
assignor in favour of the assignee: The Annangel Glory [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 45, 47 col.2. 
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direct claim against the sub-charterer; but only a right to have the charterers restrained 
from receiving the sub-charter hire or ordered to direct its payment to the owners or to 
a blocked account”.  75  The lien on sub freights has the characteristics of a fl oating charge 
in that it creates a charge over assets of the charterer, the freights or sub-hires due to 
the charterer, both present and future.  76  The right cannot be exercised if nothing is due 
to the owner. No proprietary interest is created until something is due to the owner and 
notice of lien is given. Until then the charterer can claim the freights in the ordinary 
course of business and payment by the sub-charterer will discharge it from any liability to 
the owner.  77  The giving of notice crystallises the proprietary right so that from then on 
the security becomes a fi xed charge over the debt due to the charterer. The other view is 
that the lien on sub-freights is a personal contractual right of interception analogous to an 
unpaid seller’s right of stoppage in transit, and not a charge or proprietary right at all.  78  
Whatever the basis of the right, on receipt of a notice of lien the sub-charterer will face 
two competing claims to the freight and would be wise to make a stakeholder application 
to the court under Part 86 of the Civil Procedure Rules to avoid the possibility of having 
to make a double payment.  79  
 It is also unclear whether the lien operates as an assignment of all the freight or as an 
assignment of so much of the freight as is represented by the debt owed. The former view is 
supported by observations in  The Cebu (No.1)  80  of Lloyd J, with whom Christopher Clarke 
J agreed in  The Western Moscow.  81  On this view, the security created would be a fl oating 
mortgage. However, Nourse J in  Re Welsh Irish Ferries Ltd (The Ugland Trailer)  82  was 
of the view that, “Having been given for any amounts due under the charter, it obviously 
cannot be an out-and-out assignment. It can only be an assignment by way of security 
for what is owed by the charterer to the shipowner”. If the former, the greatest amount 
claimable by the owners down the chain of assignments from the time charterers would be 
for the value of the largest sum owed at any link in the chain. If the latter, the claim could 
75 . Christopher Clarke J referred with approval to the analysis of the lien on sub-freight propounded by 
Graeme Bowtle, “Liens and Sub-freights” [2002] LMCLQ 289. 
76 . After the decision of the House of Lords in Re Spectrum Plus Ltd (in liquidation) [2005] UKHL 41; 
[2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 275; [2005] 2 AC 680, the lien on sub-freight can only be regarded as a fl oating charge, as 
it permits the sub-charterer to pay and the time charterer to receive the freight pending any exercise of the lien. 
77 . Tagart, Beaton v James Fisher [1903] 1 KB 391 (CA). 
78 . This argument was propounded by Dr Fidelis Oditah, “The Juridical Nature of a Lien on Sub-freights” 
[1989] LMCLQ 191, and has been endorsed by Lord Millett, in Agnew v IRC [2001] UKPC 28; [2001] 2 AC 
710; [2001] Lloyd’s Rep Bank 251, [38–41]. In Samsun Logix Corp v Oceantrade Corp [2007] EWHC 2372 
(Comm) [41]; [2008] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 450, [41], Gross J was of the view that: “even if the clause 18 lien is not a 
charge because, in accordance with Lord Millett’s opinion, it confers no proprietary rights, if it is analogous to 
a right of stoppage in transitu, it is likely in any event to accord priority in bankruptcy: see Benjamin’s Sale of 
Goods, 5th edn (1997), [15.062].” 
79 . See Libyan Navigator Ltd v Lamda Maritime Holdings S.P.Z.O.O., Standard Tankers LLC [2014] EWHC 
1399, where Males J held that it was appropriate to grant a sub-charterer interpleader relief requiring it to pay 
the disputed freight into court. 
80 . [1983] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 302, 308 col.2: “So here, the equitable assignment by LAMSCO to Naviera Tolteca 
was effective to transfer to Naviera Tolteca the whole right of LAMSCO to receive freight due from Itex, so long 
as there was anything due from LAMSCO to Naviera Tolteca.” 
81 . [2012] EWHC 1224 (Comm); [2012] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 163, [60–61]. 
82 . [1986] Ch 471, 478; [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 372, 374 col.2. This view was previously taken by Lord Russell 
in The Nanfri [1979] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 201, 210; [1979] AC 757, 784: “The lien operates as an equitable charge 
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be for the value of the smallest sum owed at any link in the chain. However, the distinction 
may not matter in practice, because with a fl oating mortgage once the debt secured has 
been discharged any surplus would be held on resulting trust for the debtor.  83  
 On the basis that the lien constitutes a fl oating charge, where the charterer is a UK 
company the lien must be registered in accordance with the Companies Act 2006, s.859A  84  
within 21 days of the charge being created, which will be the date of the time charter 
itself.  85  Failure to do so will render the charge void against any liquidator, administrator 
or creditor of the charterers, but the provision will apply only where the time charterer is 
a UK company.  86  
 However, registration may be required by the law of the country in which the charterer 
is incorporated, and it will be this law which will become relevant in the event of the 
charterer’s insolvency. This was the case in the recent decision of the Singapore High Court 
in  Duncan, Cameron Lindsay v Diablo Fortune Inc .  87  The Singapore charterers went into 
liquidation and the liquidator successfully contended that the lien was void against them 
for want of registration under the Singapore Companies Act, s.131(1). The shipowners 
contended that the charter was subject to English law, and that it was the UK Companies 
Act 2006 that applied to the registration of charges and whose provisions applied only to 
companies incorporated in England, Wales, or Scotland, but not to a company incorporated 
abroad. The Singapore High Court held that, as the company was incorporated in 
Singapore, the requirements of the Singapore Companies Act, s.131 applied regardless of 
the law governing the creation of the charge or the location of the property. A distinction 
needed to be made between the law governing the initial validity and/or creation of the 
security interest and the law governing the priority of such interests and the distribution 
of assets in the insolvency of the company. The latter issues are resolved by the law of the 
state in which the insolvency proceedings are commenced. The invalidity of a charge as 
against a liquidator due to non-registration is one such issue. 
 The process of claiming freight due under the sub-sub-charter by way of lien is very 
similar to that involved in claiming freight due under the bill of lading incorporating that 
sub-sub-charter. In both cases notice must be given to the sub-sub-charterer/bill of lading 
holder before freight is paid on up the chain.  88  The lien notice must inform the sub-charterers 
that the owners are assignees of debts owed by them, what debts are so assigned, that an 
amount is due to owners under the head charter, and that owners require the assigned debts 
to be paid directly to them. The notice does not need to specify how much is due to owners 
83 . By analogy with Charles v Jones (1887) 35 Ch D 544, 549. 
84 . Introduced the Companies Act 2006 (Amendment of Pt 25) Regulations 2013 (SI 2013/600) and covering 
charges created on or after 6 April 2013. 
85 . The Ugland Trailer [1986] Ch 471; [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 372, and The Annangel Glory [1988] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep 45, which were decided under the equivalent provisions of the Companies Act 1948 and the Companies Act 
1985 respectively. 
86 . Since 2011, the registration requirements no longer apply to overseas companies with a place of 
business in the UK: Overseas Companies (Execution of Documents and Registration of Charges) (Amendment) 
Regulations 2011 (SI 2011/2194). 
87 . [2017] SGHC 172; noted I Teo [2018] LMCLQ 14. 
88 . And before notice is given by any other party, such as a bank, to whom the charterer may have assigned 
the freight. The claim of the fi rst assignee to give notice will prevail, even if its assignment was not the fi rst in 
time to be created: G&N Angelakis Shipping Co SA v Compagnie National Algerienne de Navigation (The Attika 
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under the head charter,  89  provided that it specifi es that an amount is due, and can cover 
sub-freights which have not yet become due. In  The Bulk Chile the notice was given well 
before eventual payment of the sub-freight and before the time at which payment had fallen 
due, which was two banking days after completion of loading. Andrew Smith J held that an 
effective notice could be given in respect of sub-freights which would become due in the 
future.  90  The chose in action which had been assigned, the right to freight, was created when 
the charter was concluded, so there was no question of enforcement against future debts.  91  
 However, the legal basis of the two rights is not the same. One involves an assignment 
of rights to freight under a sub-charter, the other a contractual right to freight under a bill 
of lading. The lien on sub-freights may be asserted not only against the sub-charterer but 
against sub-sub-charters, if the sub-charter provides for a lien on sub freights, whereas the 
claim to freight under the bill of lading is a claim against a single party for a single amount 
of freight. The provisions of the bill of lading, such as “freight prepaid” clausing, will 
clearly affect the claim to freight, but these will have no effect on the operation of the lien 
on sub-freights. The lien on sub-freights is exercisable only if sums are due to the shipowner 
under the time charter, whereas the claim to bill of lading freight may be made irrespective 
of any sum being due under the time charter.  92  Furthermore, when notice is given to pay bill 
of lading freight, payment to the shipowner will discharge the sub-charterer’s obligation 
to pay the charterer. By contrast, when the sub-freight is the subject of a lien, payment to 
the shipowner will not effect such a discharge and the sub-charterer will need to make a 
stakeholder application to avoid the possibility of having to pay the freight a second time. 
 V. INSOLVENCY OF THE TIME CHARTERER 
 In recent years there has been a number of high profi le insolvencies of shipping lines, most 
recently that of Hanjin, which had 60 container vessels on charter at the time they fi led for 
receivership in South Korea in August 2016.  93  The insolvency of the time charterer will 
89 . The Bulk Chile [2012] EWHC 2107 (Comm); [2012] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 594, Andrew Smith J stating (at [60]): 
“(i) I do not consider that the First Notice mis-states the amount under the KLC: see para 44 above. Even if it did, 
this would not be material. In my judgment, what was required was that Metinvest be informed that there was an 
amount due, not how much was due, and (whatever the position with regard to statutory assignments) I do not 
accept that an error in unnecessary information vitiates a notice invoking the lien over sub-freights.” 
90 . Ibid, [61–67]. There was no appeal on the fi nding as to the exercise of the lien on sub-freight. 
91 . Andrew Smith J referred to the statement of Mustill LJ in relation to freight in Colonial Bank v European 
Grain & Shipping Ltd) (The Dominique) [1989] AC 1056, 1066; [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 215, 221 col.1: “All 
contractual rights are vested from the moment when the contract is made, even though they may not presently be 
enforceable, either because the promisee must fi rst perform his own part, or because some condition independent 
of the will of either party (such as the elapsing of time) has yet to be satisfi ed. Equally, all unperformed obligations 
to pay money are in one sense debitum in praesenti solvendum in futuro.” 
92 . In The Bulk Chile [2012] EWHC 2107 (Comm); [2012] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 594, [32], a claim of US$2.6 
million by DBHH, payable over 10 years, appeared to have been admitted in the KLC’s rehabilitation programme 
in Korea, but this was irrelevant to the shipowners’ claim to freight from the bill of lading holder. Similarly, in 
Byatt International SA v Canworld Shipping Co Ltd and another (The MV Loyalty) 2013 BCCA 427, another 
case involving KLC, where Donald J stated (at [25]): “Compromises made in insolvency are not relevant to the 
legal entitlements against parties not involved in the compromise.” 
93 . See www.reuters.com/article/us-hanjin-shipping-debt/all-hanjin-shipping-chartered-vessels-to-be-returned-
to-owners-after-unloading-judge-idUSKCN11P0D0. On 19 September 2016 the South Korean Court ordered 
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clearly affect owners’ claims against the time charterer, but will also have an impact on the 
exercise of the shipowner’s lien on sub-freights/sub-hires. 
 Insolvency proceedings in England and Wales will involve a statutory stay of proceedings 
against the company and its property on the making of a winding-up order.  94  Proceedings 
may be brought against the company only with the leave of the court, subject to such terms 
as the court may impose. Where property is charged as security for a debt, the company’s 
property is not the subject matter of the charge, but only its equity of redemption in 
relation to it.  95  Accordingly, the lien on sub-freights can still be exercised against a UK 
charterer, provided it has been registered in accordance with the Companies Act 2006, 
s.859A.  96  The notice of lien can be given even after the winding up proceedings have 
begun and will not be avoided as a disposition under the Insolvency Act 1986, s.127, as 
the crystallisation of a fl oating charge does not amount to a disposition of the company’s 
property.  97  There is a similar provision with administration, with an additional statutory 
moratorium on enforcing security over the company’s property except with the consent 
of the administrator or with the permission of the court, which would would affect the 
exercise of the lien on sub-freights.  98  
 Where it is a foreign charterer that is insolvent, the enforcement of the lien on sub-
freights will fall under one of two cross-border insolvency regimes. With foreign insolvency 
proceedings in a state which is party to the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross Border 
Insolvency, procedural assistance will be given to the foreign insolvency in relation to 
the insolvent party’s assets which are located in another state which is party to the Model 
Law. In the UK the Model Law is given the force of law by the Cross-Border Insolvency 
Regulations 2006 (“CBIR”). The foreign offi ce-holder in the insolvency proceedings  99  
against the time charterer will be able to obtain recognition orders in the UK which will 
entitle it to the same procedural assistance as would be available under a British insolvency. 
94 . Insolvency Act 1986, s.130(2). 
95 . See Re David Lloyd & Co (1887) 6 Ch D, Re Pyle Works Ltd (1890) 44 Ch D 534 and, more recently, 
Buchler v Talbot [2004] UKHL 9; [2004] 2 AC 298, 308 and 313. 
96 . A fl oating charge will be invalid under the Insolvency Act 1986, s.245 if created at a “relevant time”, 
which is one year for persons unconnected with the company and two years for connected persons. First, for 
unconnected persons, s.245(4) provides that “time is not a relevant time for the purposes of this section unless the 
company— (a) is at that time unable to pay its debts within the meaning of section 123 in Chapter VI of Part IV, 
or (b) becomes unable to pay its debts within the meaning of that section in consequence of the transaction under 
which the charge is created.” Additionally, for both connected and unconnected persons s.245(2)(a) provides an 
exception in respect of “(a) the value of so much of the consideration for the creation of the charge as consists of 
money paid, or goods or services supplied, to the company at the same time as, or after, the creation of the charge 
…”, which would cover the value of hire paid for the services provided by the shipowner under the time charter. 
97 . Re Margart Pty Ltd, Hamilton v Westpac Banking Corp [1985] BCLC 314; Re French’s Wine Bar Ltd 
[1987] BCLC 314 (QB). The disposition of property would occur on the creation of the charge and not on its 
crystallisation. 
98 . Insolvency Act 1986, Sch.B1, para.43(3). Administration involves issues concerning the interests of 
creditors, the company debtor and other interested parties in maintaining the existence of the debtor and its 
business in the context of rescue/turnaround proceedings. The guidelines for when the court will give permission 
to enforce security are set out in Re Atlantic Computer Systems Plc [1992] Ch 505, 529. Leave to enforce security 
would normally be granted, provided that this was unlikely to impede the achievement of the purpose for which 
the administration was being pursued. 
99 . These may be foreign main proceedings, taking place in the state where the debtor has the centre of its 
main interests; or non-main proceedings taking place in a state where the debtor has an establishment, ie any 
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The CBIR does not allow for the importing of the law of the state of the foreign insolvency 
proceedings,  100  nor does it provide an additional ground for allowing for the recognition of 
judgments arising out of those foreign insolvency proceedings.  101  
 Under the Model Law, Art.20(1), where there is a foreign main proceeding, there will 
then be an automatic stay of certain actions, such as commencement or continuation of 
actions or proceedings against the debtor or its assets, or execution against a debtor’s 
assets. However, Art.20(6) provides that the court has power to modify or terminate 
the automatic stay and to do so upon such terms and conditions as it thinks fi t. Article 
20(2), as implemented through the CBIR, requires the court to apply the same test and 
principles as it would apply to the stay of a winding-up order under the Insolvency Act 
1986, s.130(2), which gives the court a “free hand to do what is right and fair according 
to the circumstances of each case”.  102  The stay will usually be lifted when disputed claims 
need to be resolved by proceedings and it is right and fair in all the circumstances to accept 
and implement this need. Article 20(3)(a) provides, without prejudice to the provisions of 
paras 1 and 2, that the stay does not affect any right to take any steps to enforce security 
over the debtor’s property. 
 However, the enforcement of security may be prevented by the provisions of Art.21, 
which provides that, as regards both foreign main and non-main proceedings, the court 
has power to grant “any appropriate relief”, such as staying proceedings against the debtor 
or execution against the debtor’s assets and granting any additional relief that may be 
available to a British insolvency offi ce-holder under the law of Great Britain.  103  This 
includes the statutory moratorium on enforcing security over the company’s property 
except with the consent of the administrator or with the permission of the court.  104  
Security is defi ned in the Model Law, Art.2(n)(i) as including “any mortgage, charge, lien 
or other security”. Accordingly, the stay will affect the enforcement of the lien through 
100 . Fibria Cellulose S/A v Pan Ocean Co Ltd [2014] EWHC 2124 (Ch), holding that the discretionary 
power of the court to grant “any appropriate relief” under Art.21(1) did not empower an English court to apply 
Korean insolvency law rendering void ipso facto clauses. This would entail applying Korean insolvency law to 
the substantive rights of the parties under a contract governed by English law. See too the rule in Antony Gibbs 
& Sons v La Société Industrielle et Commerciale des Métaux (1890) LR 25 QBD 399, that a debt governed by 
English law cannot be discharged by a foreign insolvency proceeding. Gibbs was followed in Bakhshiyeva v 
Sberbank of Russia [2018] EWHC 59 (Ch), in which Hildyard J declined to order permanent moratorium or 
stay under the CBIR to prevent a creditor exercising its rights under a contract governed by English law contrary 
to the terms of the foreign insolvency proceeding by which all creditors were, under the relevant foreign law, 
intended to be bound. 
101 . Rubin v Eurofi nance SA [2012] UKSC 46; [2012] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 615; [2013] 1 AC 236. The CBIR and 
the Model Law said nothing about enforcement of foreign judgments. The Supreme Court held, Lord Clarke of 
Stone-cum-Ebony dissenting, that at common law the assistance extended to a foreign insolvency did not extend 
to the enforcement of foreign avoidance judgments. These could not be enforced other than through general 
rules for enforcement of foreign judgments, involving either the defendant’s presence in the foreign country 
in which the proceedings were commenced or its submission submitted to the jurisdiction of that country. The 
defendant’s participation in the foreign insolvency proceedings would amount to a submission to the resulting 
avoidance proceedings. 
102 . See Re Grosvenor Metal Co Ltd [1950] Ch 63, 65, per Vaisey J; Re Suidair International Airways Ltd 
[1951] Ch 165; Re Redman (Builders) Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 541; Re Aro Co Ltd [1980] Ch 196 (CA), 209; and 
Bourne v Charit-Email Technology Partnership LLP (in liq) [2009] EWHC 1901 (Ch); [2010] 1 BCLC 210, 
212–213. 
103 . Art.21(1)(g). 
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arbitration proceedings against the time charterer, and its sub-charterers against whom 
the lien on sub-freights has been exercised. Article 22(1) requires the court to be satisfi ed 
that the interests of the creditors (including any secured creditors or parties to hire-
purchase agreements) and other interested persons, including if appropriate the debtor, are 
adequately protected when it grants or denies relief under Art.21 or modifi es or terminates 
relief under Art.20(6).  105  
 Additional relief for the foreign representative is provided by Art.21(2), which provides 
that the court may turn over to the foreign representative assets of the insolvent located in 
Great Britain provided the court is satisfi ed that the interests of creditors in Great Britain 
are adequately protected; and by Art.23, which provides that the foreign representative 
may apply to the court for an order under the anti-avoidance provisions of the Insolvency 
Act 1986 and the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985. 
 How does this regime affect the enforcement of a lien on sub-freights, arising under 
charterparties which are subject to English law, when there are foreign insolvency 
proceedings against it in a state which is party to the Model Law? Arbitration proceedings 
against the insolvent time charterer will be subject to the automatic stay under Art.20(1). 
Similarly the arbitration proceedings against the sub-charterer, the next step in enforcing 
the shipowner’s lien, will be stayed, either automatically under Art.20(1) or under Art.21(1) 
on the application of the foreign offi ce-holder. The CBIR appears to have no application as 
regards the shipowner’s separate claim to freight under the bill of lading.  106  The court, though, 
has a discretion in lifting the stay and allowing the arbitration to proceed.  107  There have been 
two contrasting High Court decisions involving the CBIR and stays of arbitrations against 
sub-charterers in respect of freight claim under the lien on sub-freights under the time charter. 
 In  D/S Norden A/S v Samsun Logix Corp ,  108  the Korean receiver had petitioned the 
Korean Court to set aside Norden’s lien notice over the sub-hires on the ground that 
it should be avoided as it was sent out at a time when it was reasonably expected that 
Samsun was in imminent danger of becoming insolvent. It obtained a stay of arbitration 
proceedings by the shipowner against the time charterer and ordered a stay of enforcement 
of any security against the time charterer’s property under Art.21(1)(g). The shipowners 
then applied for the stays to be lifted. Their counsel argued that there was no prospect of 
an English court granting relief to give effect to a Korean decision invalidating the security 
105 . Art.22(1) will be particularly relevant where the foreign insolvency is in the nature of administration. 
Although Art.20(2) refers to a winding-up order under the Insolvency Act 1986, s.130(2), the court’s discretion 
will be exercised on similar grounds when the foreign proceedings were akin to administration, by reason of 
Art.22(1): Seawolf Tankers Inc, Heidmar Inc v Pan Ocean Co Ltd [2015] EWHC 1500 (Ch). 
106 . In The Bulk Chile [2012] EWHC 2107 (Comm); [2012] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 594, Norris J had previously 
ordered that no step might be taken to enforce any security over [KLC’s] property, but Andrew Smith J only 
addressed the order as regards the owners’ lien claim. He found that the recognition order did not affect 
the exercise of the lien as the evidence as to Korean law showed that such claims fell outside the Korean 
Comprehensive Stay Order. 
107 . The court has been prepared to lift the stay on arbitration proceedings against the time charterer where 
the contract is subject to English law and the claims involve diffi cult issues under English law, subject to an 
undertaking not to enforce any award: Seawolf Tankers Inc, Heidmar Inc v Pan Ocean Co Ltd [2015] EWHC 
1500 (Ch) (the effect of the anti-deprivation principle on an ipso facto clause), and Ronelp Marine Ltd v STX 
Offshore & Shipbuilding Co Ltd [2016] EWHC 2228 (Ch) (issues of illegality, and of the interaction between 
contractual remedies and common law remedies for repudiatory breach). 
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under the lien in circumstances where the security would not be vulnerable to challenge 
under English domestic law. While accepting the force of the submission, Mr G Newey QC 
held that questions as to the extent, if any, to which a Korean decision in the receiver’s 
favour could be enforced in England would best be addressed if and when the Korean 
court had so ruled. He ordered a stay of the enforcement of the lien on sub-hires  109  until 
the conclusion of the Korean insolvency proceedings, conditional on the time charterer, 
Samsun, and its receiver undertaking not to argue that the shipowners were bound by the 
decision of the Korean court as a result of participating in the Korean proceedings.  110  
 In the second decision,  Cosco Bulk Carrier Co Ltd v Armada Shipping SA ,  111  Briggs J 
allowed the shipowner’s arbitration against the sub-charterer to proceed but kept the stay 
in place in respect of enforcement of any resulting award. The case involving a recognition 
order of Swiss bankruptcy proceedings, which were main proceedings, against a time 
charterer, Armada. Two arbitration proceedings were afoot in respect of the competing 
claims to sub-hire due under the sub-charterer, one between the shipowner and the sub-
charterer,  112  the other commenced by the sub-charterer against the time charterer to avoid 
double jeopardy. The parties to the second arbitration had extended an invitation to the 
offi ce-holder to allow the time charterer to be joined to that arbitration. By agreement with 
the shipowner, the sub-charterer had paid the liened sub-hires into an escrow account. The 
funds in the account did not amount to assets of Armada and could not be ordered to be 
transferred to the Swiss Offi ce-holder under Art.21(2). Briggs J put to one side the question 
whether the lien on sub-freights and sub-hires created a fl oating charge under English law, 
a matter on which there was still legal uncertainty, and whether the question of priorities 
should be determined by English or Swiss law. At this stage he was not prepared to 
decide whether the shipowner was enforcing a “security” through its lien, as the juridical 
nature of the lien on sub-freight was still undecided and was ripe for consideration at 
least by the Court of Appeal. Instead, he proceeded on the assumption that the underlying 
dispute related to property in relation to which the time charterer had an arguable claim 
to a benefi cial interest, the chose in action over the sub-hires owed by the sub-charterer. 
Article 22(1) required him to be satisfi ed that this was adequately protected. This was 
achieved by applying the same test and principles as would apply to the stay of a winding-
up order under the Insolvency Act 1986, s.130(2), as mandated by Art.20(2). 
 Briggs J exercised his discretion and allowed the stay to be lifted in respect of owners’ 
arbitration proceedings against sub-charterers. The balance of fairness, convenience and 
justice pointed strongly in favour of the underlying dispute being determined in London 
arbitration rather than in the Swiss Bankruptcy Court. All the issues, except possibly 
certain aspects of the fi fth issue, as to priority, were issues of English law. The lifting of the 
stay was subject to two conditions. First, the time charterer should have liberty to apply for 
further relief under Art.22(3) if it could not be effectively joined into the fi rst arbitration, 
through no fault of its own. Secondly, “that there should be a stay of enforcement or 
109 . Under Art.21(1)(g). 
110 . This would preclude the receiver from enforcing any Korean judgment against the shipowner, leaving 
open the question of enforcement of the lien to a later determination by the English court. 
111 . [2011] EWHC 216 (Ch); [2011] 2 All ER (Comm) 481. 
112 . The owners exercised their lien in relation to their claim for an indemnity in respect of a payment made 
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execution of any arbitral award under Art.21(1)(b) until, after such an award has become 
fi nal, Armada has had the opportunity to restore the matter to this court, in the event that 
any aspect of the interests of its creditors or offi ce-holder have not been addressed by the 
arbitrators, or upon appeal”. This condition addressed the possibility of an outcome to 
the fi ve legal issues raised in relation to the owners’ exercise of the lien on sub freights  113  
that might give rise to a priority issue as between Cosco and Armada’s offi ce-holder or 
creditors which the arbitration process would be ill-suited to resolve. This was particularly 
true of the fi fth issue, the consequences in terms of priority in Armada’s bankruptcy.  114  
 These two decisions leave hanging the question what would be the effect of a decision 
in the foreign insolvency proceedings that the shipowner’s lien either had no proprietary 
effect or was unenforceable for non-registration as a charge under the law of the place 
of the insolvency proceedings.  115  The CBIR affords procedural assistance to the foreign 
insolvency but does not affect the substantive law relating to rights  in rem . With a lien on 
sub-freights, which is created by an assignment in a time charter that contains a reference 
to English law, the substantive law regarding the proprietary effect of the lien would be that 
of England and should be unaffected by any confl icting decision in the foreign insolvency 
proceedings—such as non-recognition of the lien as a proprietary right. Priority issues, 
though, should fall to be determined under the law of the insolvency.  116  In exercising its 
discretion as to whether to lift the stay on enforcement of any arbitration award against the 
sub-charterer, the court would probably be guided by these considerations. 
 The second cross-border insolvency regime which will affect the enforcement of the 
lien on sub-freight is the 2015 Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings (recast),  117  which 
will apply where the insolvency proceedings take place in a Member State of the EU, 
except Denmark.  118  Unlike the CBIR,  119  which has only procedural effect, the Regulation 
113 . These issues were: 
 (1) The juridical nature and effect of an owner’s lien on sub-hire;
 (2) the effect of the prohibition on assignment in the sub-charter;
 (3) whether the lien was exercised for an excessive amount and, if so, with what consequence;
 (4) whether Cosco can rely upon the lien in respect of its claim to an indemnity for its payment for bunkers;
 (5) the consequences in terms of priority in Armada’s bankruptcy. 
114 . It is likely that this issue would be held not to be arbitrable, as was held by the Singapore High Court in 
Duncan, Cameron Lindsay v Diablo Fortune Inc [2017] SGHC 172. If a priority issue did arise, that would have 
to be reconsidered by the court at the time the owners applied to lift the stay of enforcement or execution of the 
arbitration award, or the offi ce-holder restored the matter to the court. 
115 . Compare the view expressed in D/S Norden v Samsun [2009] EWHC 2304 (Ch) with that in Samsun 
Logix Corp v Oceantrade Corp [2007] EWHC 2372 (Comm); [2008] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 450, where the time 
charterer, OTC, became subject to Chapter 11 proceedings in the US, and sub-freights had been paid into the 
account of its London solicitors. Gross J noted (at [25]) that: “It is not in dispute that the ultimate fate of the funds 
in the Mills account rests (at least primarily) in the hands of the US Bankruptcy Court, by reason of that court’s 
jurisdiction over the Chapter 11 proceedings concerning OTC.” 
116 . So held by the Singapore High Court in Duncan, Cameron Lindsay v Diablo Fortune Inc [2017] SGHC 
172, applying the decision of Hoffmann J in Re Weldtech Equipment Ltd [1991] BCLC 393, 395, that the 
Companies Act 1985, s.395 applied to a charge created by an English company, although the proper law of the 
instrument creating the charge was that of Germany. 
117 . Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency 
proceedings (recast). The recast Regulation applies to insolvency proceedings commenced on or after 26 June 
2017. Proceedings commenced before that date fall under Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 
2000 on Insolvency Proceedings. 
118 . Denmark does not participate in the judicial cooperation between the EU Member States. 
119 . Article 3 of the CBIR provides that: “To the extent that this Law confl icts with an obligation of the United 
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has both substantive and procedural effect. Article 3(1) provides that the courts of the 
Member State within the territory of which the centre of a debtor’s main interests (the 
“COMI”)  120  is situated are to have jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings.  121  Article 
20 provides that the effect of opening these proceedings shall “[p]roduce the same effects 
in any other Member State as under this law of the State of the opening of proceedings”.  122  
 Article 7(1) provides that the law applicable to insolvency proceedings and their 
effects shall be that of the Member State within the territory of which such proceedings 
are opened.  123  Article 7(2) provides a list of particular matters which the law of that 
Member State is to determine, such as “… (b) the assets which form part of the estate 
and the treatment of assets acquired by or devolving on the debtor after the opening of the 
insolvency proceedings … (f) the effects of the insolvency proceedings on proceedings 
brought by individual creditors, with the exception of lawsuits pending … (m) the rules 
relating to the voidness, voidability or unenforceability of legal acts detrimental to all the 
creditors”.  124  Article 16 provides an exception to Art.7(2)(m) by disapplying it “where 
the person who benefi ted from an act detrimental to all the creditors provides proof that: 
(a) the act is subject to the law of a Member State other than that of the State of the 
opening of proceedings; and (b) the law of that Member State does not allow any means 
of challenging that act in the relevant case”. This means that avoidance provisions in the 
 lex fori concursus will not be applied where the detrimental act, which took place before 
the opening of the insolvency proceedings, would not be challengeable under the avoidance 
provisions of the  lex causae .  125  With a lien on sub-freights, the “detrimental act” would be 
the giving of notice at a time when the owner was aware that the time charterer was facing 
insolvency. If the charter was subject to English law, the notice would not be challengeable 
under the UK insolvency legislation, and would not be avoided even if subject to avoidance 
under the insolvency legislation of the  lex fori concursus . 
 Article 8  126  provides an exception to the general rule in relation to pre-existing  in rem 
rights over assets within the territory of another Member State. It provides: 
 “1.  The opening of insolvency proceedings shall not affect the rights in rem of creditors or third 
parties in respect of tangible or intangible, moveable or immoveable assets—both specifi c assets 
and collections of indefi nite assets as a whole which change from time to time—belonging to 
120 . In the case of a company or legal person, the place of the registered offi ce shall be presumed to be the 
centre of its main interests in the absence of proof to the contrary. 
121 . Where the debtor has an establishment in another Member State, the courts of that Member State may 
open secondary insolvency proceedings 
122 . Formerly Art.17 of the 2000 Insolvency Proceedings Regulation. 
123 . Formerly Art.4(1) of the 2000 Insolvency Proceedings Regulation. 
124 . Formerly Art.4(2) of the 2000 Insolvency Proceedings Regulation. 
125 . In Vinyls Italia SpA v Mediterranea Navigazione SpA (Case C-54/16) Judgment of the Court (Fifth 
Chamber) 8 June 2017, the ECJ recently considered the Insolvency Regulation 2000, Art.13 (the predecessor 
to Art.16). The ECJ held: (1) the party bearing the burden of proof must show that, where the lex causae makes 
it possible to challenge an act regarded as being detrimental, the conditions to be met in order that challenge to 
be upheld, which differ from those of the lex fori concursus, have not actually been fulfi lled; (2) Art.13 applies 
where both parties to the contract are established in the lex fori concursus, provided the parties did not choose 
their contractual law for abusive or fraudulent ends; (3) the form and time limits for relying on Art.13 are 
determined by the rules laid down by the lex fori concursus. 
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the debtor which are situated within the territory of another Member State at the time of the 
opening of proceedings.” 
 Article 8 is worded so as to cover fl oating charges, with its reference in para.1 to 
“collections of indefi nite assets as a whole which change from time to time”. With a 
lien on sub-freights, the charge will be created at the date of the charterparty, although it 
crystallises later. Thus, Art.8 will apply if the charterparty is created before the opening of 
insolvency proceedings. Article 8(2) then provides a list of four categories of rights which 
constitute right  in rem under para.1. The fi rst two include rights arising by way of a lien.  127  
 The Art.8 exception means that the basis, validity and extent of the right will be 
determined by the non-insolvency law of the  lex situs as regards rights  in rem which are 
already in existence at the time of the opening of the insolvency proceedings. In locating 
where the asset, the chose in action which is subject to the lien, is situated, guidance is 
provided by Art.2(9)(viii),  128  which defi nes “claims” in relation to “the Member State in 
which the assets are situated”, as “the Member State within the territory of which the 
third party required to meet them has the centre of his main interests, as determined in 
art. 3(1)”. With a lien on sub-freight, the asset would be situated in the Member State 
in which the sub-charterer has its COMI, and it would be the law of that Member State 
which determined the  in rem rights against the asset.  129  This is in contrast to the position 
under the choice of law rules for assignments under the Rome I Regulation, Art.14, under 
which the substantive law relating to the  in rem effect of the lien on sub-freight would 
be determined by the choice of law in the time charter which created the assignment.  130  
However, the exception in Art.8 applies only where the asset is located within the territory 
of another Member State at the opening of proceedings and does not apply where the asset 
is located in a non-Member State. Further, Art.8(4) provides that the  in rem exception 
does not preclude actions for voidness, voidability or unenforceability, as referred to in 
Art.7(2)(m).  131  
 The exercise of the lien, by commencement of proceedings against the sub-charterer, 
would also appear to fall within the further exception provided in Art.18,  132  where judicial 
or arbitral proceedings are commenced before the opening of insolvency proceedings in the 
127 . (a) the right to dispose of assets or have them disposed of and to obtain satisfaction from the proceeds 
of or income from those assets, in particular by virtue of a lien or a mortgage; (b) the exclusive right to have a 
claim met, in particular a right guaranteed by a lien in respect of the claim or by assignment of the claim by way 
of a guarantee. 
128 . Formerly, Art.2(g) of the 2000 Insolvency Proceedings Regulation. 
129 . Recital 68 (formerly recital 25) states: “The basis, validity and extent of rights in rem should therefore 
normally be determined according to the lex situs and not be affected by the opening of insolvency proceedings. 
The proprietor of a right in rem should therefore be able to continue to assert its right to segregation or separate 
settlement of the collateral security.” 
130 . Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 17 June 2008, on the 
law applicable to contractual obligations (“Rome I”). Article 14 provides that the law in the contract creating the 
assignment governs the relationship between assignor and assignee and that law determines the assignability of 
the claim, “(2) ... the relationship between the assignee and the debtor, the conditions under which the assignment 
or subrogation can be invoked against the debtor and whether the debtor’s obligations have been discharged.” 
131 . Which is, in turn, subject to an exception under Art.16. 
132 . Formerly Art.15 of the 2000 Insolvency Proceedings Regulation, which referred only to law suits, but 
was held to extend to arbitration. The question whether pending lawsuits should be continued or discontinued 
in the light of insolvency is to be determined by the law of the state in which those proceedings are pending: 
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time charterer’s COMI. In such an event, Art.18 provides for the effects of the insolvency 
proceedings on the pending lawsuit or pending arbitral proceedings to be governed solely 
by the law of the Member State in which the law suit is pending or in which the arbitral 
tribunal has its suit. However, this exception will not apply to the enforcement proceedings 
arising from a law suit or arbitral proceedings.  133  
 It is also possible that the insolvency law of the Member State in which the time charterer 
has its COMI could extend its reach to proceedings against the bill of lading holder in respect 
of the same freight, through incorporation of the sub-charter. Although the bill of lading is 
a separate contract from the sub-charter, payment of freight to the shipowner under the bill 
of lading will discharge the sub-charterer’s obligation to pay freight to the time charterer 
under the sub-charter, and so reduce the assets of the insolvent time charterer. In  Aria Inc v 
Credit Agricole Corporate and Investment Bank ,  134  a bank guarantee was put up to prevent 
the arrest of the vessel by a bunker supplier who had provided bunkers to the sub-charterer. 
The guarantee was funded by the shipowners and covered a judgment against either the 
shipowner or the sub-charterer. Insolvency proceedings were subsequently opened in 
Greece against the sub-charterer. The guarantee could not be regarded as property of 
the insolvent sub-charterer but under Greek law the liquidator had the power to prevent 
acts which would damage the interests of the creditors. The bankruptcy estate would be 
prejudiced by allowing a claim to be made on the guarantee because this would generate a 
back-to-back contingent claim of the owners against the time charterer which would then 
be passed on to the insolvent sub-charterer. The English court granted an injunction to 
prevent the bunker suppliers claiming on the guarantee in respect of a judgment obtained 
in France. Similarly, owners’ claim to freight under the bill of lading might be enjoined 
because its effect would discharge the sub-charterer’s liability for freight to the insolvent 
charterer and so reduce the assets available in the insolvency. 
 VI. CONCLUSION 
 After a withdrawal, the shipowner will seek to claim: fi rst, any accrued claims under the 
charter, including unpaid hire up to the date of withdrawal, plus interest; second, the costs 
of dealing with the cargo on board the vessel at the time of withdrawal, which will be 
the market rate plus bunkers consumed from the time of withdrawal to the removal of the 
cargo from the vessel; third, damages for the difference between the charter rate and the 
market rate for the unexpired residue of the charter (assuming the charter rate is higher 
than the market rate). 
The shipowner will always be able to claim the fi rst of these from the charterer. Following 
the Supreme Court’s decision in  The Kos , the shipowner will also be able to recover the 
second head by way of indemnity from the charterer, such costs being the consequences 
of complying with the charterer’s orders to load the cargo and issue bills of lading for its 
133 . In LBI hf v Kepler Capital Markets SA (Case C-85/12) 24.10.2013 the effect of a parallel provision in 
Directive 2001/24/EC was construed so that the words “lawsuits pending” covered only substantive proceedings 
and not enforcement actions arising from such lawsuits. 
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carriage. Where the cargo belongs to the charterer, there is an additional ground of recovery 
based on bailment. However, it will have no automatic right to claim the third item. The 
duty to pay hire is not a condition—if it were, a single breach would justify termination 
and recovery of damages. As the obligation to pay hire is an intermediate term, recovery 
under this heading will be dependent on a fi nding that there has been a renunciation by 
the charterer through a persistent pattern of under-payment or late payments of hire, and 
that the consequences of this renunciation are suffi ciently serious to go to the root of the 
contract. The fi rst element should be evidenced by a repeated failure over a matter of 
months to make full payment of hire, although there will always be some uncertainty as 
to what pattern of past default will evidence the charterer’s refusal to perform the contract 
according to its terms in the future—as witness the fi nding in  The Brimnes that a persistent 
pattern of delays in payment of some days over a period of over a year did not amount to 
a renunciation. Once renunciation is established, it should be straightforward to establish 
that its consequences are suffi ciently serious to go to the root of the contract, given the 
analysis adopted the Court of Appeal in  Spar Shipping . 
 Claims for freight, or quantum meruit remuneration, may also be asserted against third 
parties involved in the carriage of the goods on board the vessel at the date of the withdrawal, 
a matter of importance to the shipowner in the event of the insolvency of its time charterer. 
 The Bulk Chile establishes a clear road map to recovery in such circumstances. The fi rst 
route is through the bill of lading contract. If this is a shipowner’s bill and incorporates 
the terms of a charter (usually a sub-, or sub-sub-charter), the shipowner will have a direct 
contractual nexus with the bill of lading shipper and, provided notice is given in time, the 
shipowner will be able to require payment of freight due under the incorporated charter 
to itself, rather than to the nominated payee under the charter. The existence of “freight 
prepaid” clausing will not avail the shipper if it is party to the incorporated charter, in 
which case there will be no estoppel as it will have direct knowledge as to whether or 
not freight has in fact been paid. The full freight can be claimed, although the shipowner 
will have to account for any excess received over the amount of its claims against the 
time charterer. Uncertainty remains as to whom the shipowner should account for this 
excess—the time charterer, as suggested by  Time Charters , or the disponent owner who 
is entitled to the freight under the incorporated charter. It is also assumed that payment 
to the shipowner will discharge the charterer’s obligation to pay freight to the nominated 
payee under the incorporated charter. Additionally a sub-charterer who is not a party to 
the bill of lading contract may fi nd that a new contract comes into operation between itself 
and the shipowner if it requests the shipowner to fulfi l the voyages specifi ed in the bill of 
lading, as Fayette found out to its cost in  The Bulk Chile . Non-contractual claims may also 
be relevant where there is no contractual link with the shipowner, such as when the cargo 
is being carried under charterer’s bills of lading. 
 A similar route to recovery, although legally distinct, is through the lien on sub-freights, 
or sub-hires, that is found in most time charters. The claim here is limited to the amount 
outstanding to the shipowner at the date at which notice is given to the party liable to 
pay freight under a sub- or sub-sub-charter. Uncertainties still remain as to the nature 
of the right which is given, although the consensus of fi rst instance opinion is that the 
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equitable mortgage, over the chose in action, and that the lien on sub-freight will not 
operate over sub-hire. The shipowner’s right to lien down the chain of charters will be 
blocked as soon as it encounters a trip charter or a charter containing a prohibition on 
assignment. 
The ability to claim against parties other than the time charterer will be particularly 
important for the shipowner in the event of the time charterer’s insolvency. However, the 
effect of an insolvency will cast a shadow over the enforcement of a lien on sub-freights 
due to the time charterer and, arguably over the contractual claim under the bill of lading 
to those sub-freights if the bill of lading has incorporated that sub-charter. The applicable 
cross-border regime will depend on whether the charterer’s centre of main interests is 
within a Member State of the EU, excluding Denmark. If so, the Insolvency Regulation 
(Recast) will apply and the substantive law of the place in which insolvency proceedings 
are opened will determine how and when the lien may be enforced, subject to the 
 in rem exception in Art.8. For insolvencies outside the EU, the Cross Border Insolvency 
Regulation will be the applicable regime. It is likely that proceedings against the sub-
charterer will be allowed to continue, but that enforcement of any resulting judgment or 
award will have to wait until the conclusion of the foreign insolvency proceedings. Here 
there is an unresolved issue of whether the English courts will grant relief to give effect 
to a foreign decision invalidating the security under the lien in circumstances where the 
security would not be vulnerable to challenge under English domestic law.
